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Introduction 
 In our globalized world, there are many cases of social injustices happening due to the 
capitalistic economic system and the laws and norms that support it. One of the most common 
cases of these types of injustices is the harms to factory workers caused by sweatshop labor 
conditions. Last year, the Global Labor Justice reported that more than 540 workers at the 
factories that supply the two large global fashion brands, Gap and H&M, have described 
incidents of gender-based violence such as sexual harassment and abuse.1 Moreover, the Clean 
Clothes Campaign also reported last year that the share of production costs of Nike and Adidas 
shoes distributed to workers’ earning was 30% less than the share in the 1990s. These two large 
sportswear companies have also shifted most of their supply sources from China to Indonesia, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam to seek lower labor costs. Thus, factory workers’ average salaries are 45 
to 65% below the “living wage.”2  
 These injustices described above, involving violations of human rights of the workers and 
trapping them in poverty, are serious moral matters. However, there is a problem with the way 
people look at such injustices. People focus on trying to find who should be blamed for such 
injustices and demand that those who are liable for the injustices mitigate them. In both reports, 
the Global Labor Justice and the Clean Clothes Campaign focused on how those large global 
apparel brands responded to accusations against them and how they should change their policies 
to mitigate the harms against their factory workers. Although those companies must bear some 
																																																						
1 Kate Hodal, “Abuse is daily reality for female garment workers for Gap and H&M, says report,” last modified 
June 5, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/05/female-garment-workers-gap-hm-
south-asia. 
2 Kieran Guilbert, “Adidas, Nike urged to ensure fair wages for Asian workers making World Cup kits,” last 
modified July 11, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-workers-worldcup/adidas-nike-urged-to-ensure-fair-
wages-for-asian-workers-making-world-cup-kits-idUSKBN1J727J. Note: the “living wage” is the wage that would 
allow them to cover their families’ basic needs, said the global coalition of trade unions, workers and human rights 
groups. 
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parts of responsibility for improving their factory workers’ working conditions, this way of 
thinking is too narrow. It just focuses on who should be blamed for some injustices, and it clouds 
people’s eyes so they cannot see the fundamental structural problems of creating such global 
injustices. The harms to factory workers caused by sweatshops are injustices resulting from the 
structure of society where all consumers, a factory manager, its owner, and a CEO of the global 
apparel firm are interconnected in the international economic structure. Iris Young calls this type 
of injustice as structural injustice.3 People cannot blame a particular agent for solving this type of 
injustice. Instead, many more people who might not be liable for the injustice must also bear 
individual responsibility for contributing to the elimination of the structural injustice. 
  In this thesis, I will try to analyze why people should care about such structural injustice 
and how they can discharge their individual responsibilities for solving structural injustice. In 
chapter 1, I will explain why the structure of society is the main subject of justice to understand 
the moral significance of discussing structural injustice. I will compare John Rawls’s and 
Young’s argument on this matter and provide reasons why I support Young’s argument. 
 In chapter 2, I will introduce three existing models of moral theory, the Liability Model, 
the Social Connection Model, the Role-Ideal Model. I will argue that the ways these models try 
to assign people individual responsibility to solve structural injustice give us an incomplete 
picture of our responsibilities.  
 In chapter 3, I will introduce sweatshops as an empirical case of structural injustice in 
details. As I describe this empirical case, I will try to persuade readers that structural injustice is 
a morally significant matter that everyone individually should have responsibility for solving. I 
																																																						
3 Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 45. 
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will also discuss some philosophical challenges that oppose interference with the working 
conditions of sweatshop labor offered by Matt Zwolinski.  
 In chapter 4, I will introduce my model, the Global Citizens Model, to respond to 
problems that arise when trying to assign individual responsibility for structural injustice. I will 
show that this model provides an attractive solution to understand personal responsibility for 
rectifying structural injustice.  
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Chapter 1: The Structure of Society as the Main Subject of Justice  
In this chapter, I will present an idea that the main subject of justice is the structure of 
society, and explain why Young’s focus on rectifying the existing non-ideal structure is better 
than Rawls’s focus on articulating and justifying the theoretically ideal structure. Rawls claims, 
“The primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society.” in A Theory of Justice and 
Political Liberalism.4 Young later joined this discussion and agrees with Rawls that the main 
focus of justice is the structure of society. Although both philosophers consider that the structure 
is the key to discussing justice in society, they have different views toward what kind of structure 
we should focus on.  
 I will discuss how both philosophers understand that the structure of society is the 
subject of justice and how they differ in their viewpoints in three different sections. First, I will 
discuss why it is important to focus on the structure as the subject of justice. Both philosophers 
agree in this point, however, they have different reasons to support it. Second, I will discuss why 
it is important to focus on rectifying injustice rather than articulating and justifying an ideal 
model of just society. Rawls primarily tries to describe what just society is like. However, Young 
believes that an ideal model of just society is not very useful because the current society is 
nothing like ideally just society. Instead, we should discuss more how to solve structural injustice 
by focusing on the existing non-ideal social structure. Third, I will discuss how to achieve social 
justice. Rawls believes that we should first theorize about just society and second solve 
inequalities among people by designing just institutions and laws following the two principles of 
justice. On the other hand, Young argues that individual persons are also responsible for 
addressing structural injustice to achieve social justice. By comparing the account that each 
																																																						
4 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 7.  
  Shirakawa 6 
 
philosopher offers of the structure that matters for theorizing about justice, I will offer reasons in 
support of some of Young’s account.  
Why is it Important to Focus on the Structure of Society as the Subject of Justice? 
Rawls claims that the main subject of justice is the basic structure of society. He defines 
the basic structure as “the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental 
rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.”5 For 
example, the laws on fundamental human rights, the economic structure, the political 
constitution, and the family are major social institutions in his viewpoint.6 Rawls argues that 
what the Aristotelian traditional idea of justice requires, which are just behaviors in interpersonal 
interactions, would not be achieved without just background conditions.7 He also believes that 
the basic structure of society has a profound effect on justice because it can create deep 
inequalities among people by letting those who were born into a particular social position have 
better life prospects than others.8 Thus, he explains that focusing on this basic structure is 
essential because the just basic structure secures just background conditions.9 
Young also argues that it is important to focus on the structure of society as the subject of 
justice. However, her main concern is structural injustice as the cause of many social injustices.10 
She defines structural injustice as “When social processes put large groups of persons under 
systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their 
																																																						
5 Rawls, Justice, 7. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 10  
8 Ibid., 7. 
9 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 260. 
10 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 53. 
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capacities, at the same time that these processes enable others to dominate or to have a wide 
range of opportunities for developing and exercising capacities available to them.”11  
In her book, she discusses the example of Sandy, who is suffering because she cannot 
find affordable housing due to structural injustice.12 In this example, there is no injustice caused 
directly by individual interactions and no discriminatory intent in laws and policies. Nonetheless, 
Sandy suffered because when private and public actors try to pursue their own interests 
following the accepted rules and norms, Sandy’s options for affordable housing as a poor single 
mother are severely restricted in the seemingly just society. Young further argues that Sandy’s 
situation is not just a matter of luck but is the result of the functioning of the social structure.13 
She believes that individual actions have an influence on the structure and we could prevent 
structural injustice by changing individual actions.14 
Young also believes that Rawls’s way of thinking about the basic structure is mistaken. 
She argues that Rawls is just looking for a subset of social institutions as those that form the 
basic structure. However, Young believes that structure is actually a certain way of looking at 
society. Therefore, the structure is not a part of society but is created by individual interactions. 
It can be a pattern of relations among people made by individual interactions in society and 
position relative to one another. 15  
Rawls argues that justice depends on how the institutions of the basic structure function: 
whether they satisfy the principles of justice or not. As long as we have a just basic structure, we 
have a just society where people can live justly. Therefore, it is fundamental to focusing on the 
																																																						
11 Young, Responsibility for justice, 52. Note: Domination means here that people’s control over their own 
circumstances    
12 Ibid., 43-44. 
13 Ibid., 47. 
14 Ibid., 40.  
15 Ibid., 70.  
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model of a just basic structure. Contrary, Young argues that injustice comes from the structure of 
society, and the relevant structure includes more than a subset of social institutions. Although we 
may have a reasonably just constitution and laws, we create structural injustice through social-
structural processes among private and public sectors. Therefore, it is important to focus on this 
existing non-ideal structure and think about how to rectify injustices resulting from the social-
structural processes.  
Rawls is right that the structure of society is an important subject of justice. However, 
how he thinks about this structure is limited as Young argues. By expanding the scope of 
structure to how individual actions create the structure of society, we can analyze how this 
structure is essential to creating many injustices in society as seen in Sandy’s case. Therefore, I 
agree with Young that it is more important to focus on the non-ideal structure because it is the 
source of many injustices in society than to focus on the ideal model of the just basic structure. 
In the next section, I will discuss the two different motivations to focus on the structure as the 
subject of justice by Rawls and Young. I will explain why focusing on rectifying injustice is 
more important than articulating a model of an ideally just society. 
Why is it Important to Focus on Rectifying Injustice rather than Articulating a Model of a 
Just Society? 
Rawls argues that articulating a model of the just society is vital because an ideal theory 
can explain the basis of why social injustices occur.16 He also believes that many injustices such 
as inequality among individuals are inevitable consequences of social structures, and figuring out 
what just institutions look like can help us solve the problem of how to rectify such injustices.17 
Therefore, it is important to examine what a well-ordered society looks like.  
																																																						
16 Rawls, Justice, 9.  
17 Ibid., 7.		
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However, he does not formulate correctly what the structure that is the subject of justice 
is and what Rawls understands as structural injustice is not the only thing that we should be 
concerned with.18 Young criticizes Rawls’s moral division of labor that distinguishes moral 
principles applying to the basic structure from moral principles applying to individual 
interactions.19 Rawls argues that there can be a just structure as long as institutions and laws 
function reasonably well according to principles of justice. However, Young argues that a moral 
division of labor does not capture structural injustices resulting from individual actions under 
reasonably just institutions and laws.20  
She explains that social-structural processes create such structural injustices. For 
example, people tend to regard aspects of the social structure as objective facts, for example, 
they consider unemployment as a naturally occurred phenomenon of the labor market although 
people contribute to making such a structure. Regarding the structure as given constrains 
people’s possibilities of action and creates more inequality in an occupational hierarchy.21 
Moreover, people’s possibilities of action are also tied with positions relative to one another such 
as being a single mother versus being a male white-collar worker. Therefore, just being in a 
specific position sometimes creates inequality.22 Thus, although people may live within 
reasonably just laws, they could still suffer from injustices due to social-structural processes. In 
order to solve injustices in society, Young argues that it is more important to focus on rectifying 
structural injustice than just describing what a just society is.  
																																																						
18 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 65.  
19 Ibid., 66. 
20 Ibid., 68.  
21 Ibid., 55.  
22 Ibid., 56-59.  
  Shirakawa 10 
 
Rawls admits that there is a limitation in his theory by claiming that his account assumes 
the well-ordered society.23 Although he tries to explain that having a clear picture of a just 
society can help to rectify many social injustices, Young successfully denies his argument by 
showing that there are many instances of structural injustices resulting from individual actions 
under reasonably just laws and institutions. Therefore, I agree with Young that it is more 
important to focus on rectifying injustice than articulating a justification of a just society. In the 
third section, I will discuss how both philosophers propose that we can achieve social justice. 
How to Achieve Social Justice? 
In order to achieve social justice, Rawls first theorizes what the just society looks like. 
After theorizing about it, we should ensure that the just basic structure guarantees equal liberties 
and rights to people, and allows inequalities only when those inequalities produce benefits for 
the least advantaged groups.24 He claims that the difference principle can be used to rectify 
inequalities that do not benefit the least advantaged, and he assumes that just institutions and 
laws can solve this problem.25 Rawls also makes room for some reforms to be initiated by 
citizens when there are serious violations of justice such as losing basic liberties and rights in 
unjust and non-ideal circumstances.26 
Young opposes Rawls’s difference principle by arguing that this principle ignores certain 
non-distributive problems. For example, she explains in her article that the social division of 
labor along gender lines creates inequalities that the difference principle cannot solve when 
husbands do paid work and wives do unpaid work at home.27  
																																																						
23 Rawls, Justice, 8.  
24 Ibid., 61. 
25 Rawls, Liberalism, 285.  
26 Rawls, Justice, 363-368. 
27 Iris Marion Young, “Taking the Basic Structure Seriously,” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 1 (2006): 91. Notes: 
This is a problem because a wife does not get paid by doing a housework although a husband get paid by working at 
a company. This division makes a woman financially inferior to a man unfairly.  
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Moreover, Gerald Cohen argues that the difference principle does not help to reduce 
inequality to achieve social justice.28 Rawls sometimes regards coercive institutions such as legal 
entities as the basic structure, however, also includes non-coercive entities such as the family in 
the basic structure at other times. In that case, Rawls cannot merely rely on the difference 
principle to rectify inequality because this principle does not solve problems such as the social 
division of labor in the non-coercive structure. Then, Cohen argues that we need to take into 
account the instances of personal justice in the basic structure to deal with inequality when the 
non-coercive structure such as the family is included in the basic structure.29 Moreover, Cohen 
argues that individual actions might have a more substantial effect on inequality than the basic 
structure does since some people have more power than others in the structure; therefore, 
personal justice is the key to solving inequality.30 Thus, Rawls’s account of the difference 
principle is not entirely adequate to solve a problem of inequality since he fails to take account of 
personal decisions on social justice. 
Young is also primarily concerned with the problem of how to solve structural injustice 
in the existing non-ideal society to achieve social justice. She argues that we should make two 
different kinds of normative judgments referring to structure and normative judgments referring 
to individual interactions in order to rectify structural injustice. In structural injustice, it is 
important to distinguish two levels of injustices. First, it is important that we do not treat others 
unjustly in individual interactions. Second, although we do not treat others unjustly in individual 
																																																						
28 G. A. Cohen, “Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 26, no. 1 
(1997): 18. 
29 Ibid., 24. 
30 Ibid., 23. Note: Personal justice means here that personal decision of the justice  
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interactions, there still might be structural injustice against them. In that case, it is important that 
we do not act in a way that reinforces background conditions which cause structural injustice. 31  
I agree with Young’s and Cohen’s objections to Rawls that the difference principle is not 
enough to rectify injustices in society. As Young argues, there are many non-distributive 
injustices in society, and there are some injustices that institutions themselves cannot help to 
solve. People sometimes regard institutions and laws as objective facts. However, if these 
institutions and laws are parts of the processes that generate structural injustices, rules made by 
these structures may exacerbate the injustices against people. Therefore, it is important to focus 
on changing individual actions which contribute to making structural injustice to achieve social 
justice.  
Conclusion of Chapter 1 
In conclusion, Rawls’s account of the basic structure is too narrow. It is crucial that 
Rawls raised the idea that we should think about justice in terms of the social structure. 
However, by limiting the scope of the structure as a subset of institutions, he misses many 
structural injustices which Young points out. 
Moreover, Rawls seeks to solve problems of social injustices by identifying first what a 
just society is and second trying to create such a society. However, the moral division of labor 
between institutions and laws on the one hand, and individual persons on the other, does not 
work. People can still contribute to creating structural injustice even when there are reasonably 
just laws and institutions.  
Finally, Rawls’s difference principle cannot help us rectify structural injustices to achieve 
social justice either because this principle misses many non-distributive problems. Rawls himself 
																																																						
31 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 71.  
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cannot define what the basic structure is with precision, and this is supposed to have an impact 
on the workings of the difference principle. All of Rawls’s problems come from his belief that 
the way to achieve social justice is by making a just constitution, just laws and just basic social 
institutions. However, Young clearly shows that structural injustice is actually more complicated 
than Rawls thinks. Individual interactions in social-structural processes create unjust background 
conditions which contribute to making injustice against people. Since institutions and laws 
cannot solve such injustices, it is crucial to discuss how to rectify structural injustice resulting 
from individual actions. Thus, in the next chapter, I will discuss how existing models of 
individual responsibility for structural injustice actually assign responsibility for individual 
actions to solve structural injustice.  
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Chapter 2: Existing Models of Individual Responsibility to Solve Structural 
Injustice 
In this chapter, I will analyze and describe limitations of three existing models assigning 
individual responsibility to rectify structural injustice: The Liability Model (LM), the Social 
Connection Model (SCM), and the Role-Ideal Model (RIM). Young first introduces the liability 
model of assigning responsibility for structural injustice. She argues that the LM is not suitable 
for explaining this type of responsibility, so she proposes the social connection model to explain 
individual responsibility to rectify structural injustice. Robin Zheng explains the limitations of 
Young’s SCM to assign this responsibility and proposes the role-ideal model to rectify structural 
injustice.  
I will first explain the LM and the problems of this model to assign responsibility for 
solving structural injustice. Second, I will explain the SCM and the benefits of this model to 
assign this responsibility as Young describes. Third, I will explain the RIM and how Zheng 
argues that it is better than Young’s SCM. Fourth, I will discuss some problems of Zheng’s 
arguments against the SCM, problems with the RIM, and fundamental problems in both the SCM 
and the RIM. These problems concern the vagueness of their accounts of individual 
responsibility, which makes neither of them suitable for rectifying structural injustice.  
The Liability Model (LM) 
 Young argues that the liability model is the most common model of assigning 
responsibility as conceptions of moral responsibility most often assume a liability model of 
responsibility in both philosophical discussions and legal cases.32 Therefore, it is important to 
																																																						
32 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 97. 
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understand what the LM is involved and analyze why this model cannot explain individual 
responsibility in relation to structural injustice.  
Young introduces the liability model in her book in the following way. This model is 
“assigning responsibility under the law and in moral judgment that seek to identify liable parties 
for the purposes of sanctioning, punishing, or exacting compensation or redress.”33 She argues 
that conditions of being liable parties are that the parties are particular agents whose actions can 
be shown to be causally connected to the circumstances for which responsibility is sought, and 
they acted voluntarily with the adequate knowledge of the situation.34 Therefore, “To be 
responsible is to be guilty or at fault for having caused a harm and without valid excuses.”35 
Before presenting problems of this model for assigning responsibility for rectifying 
structural injustice, I will emphasize that the liability model is still important to respond to and 
prevent certain kinds of injustice in general since many injustices are clearly caused by particular 
agents. For example, if you injure a person by kicking him, you are responsible for the injustice 
of his injury in a liability sense. Moreover, if the government of a developing country allows 
unlawful labor practices such as unpaid forced labor in garment factories in its country to attract 
investment from multi-national corporations by knowing that such labor practices make its 
citizens suffer, this government is liable for the injustice of such unlawful labor conditions.36 
Therefore, the liability model is still important to assign responsibility for solving many 
injustices in the world. However, I agree with Young that the liability model of responsibility is 
not suitable for assigning responsibility for rectifying structural injustice because a backward-
																																																						
33 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 98. 
34 Ibid., 97. 
35 Ibid., 104.  
36 See an empirical case of unpaid forced labor from this article. Peter Bengtsen, “China’s Forced Labor Problem,” 
last modified March 21, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/chinas-forced-labor-problem.   
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looking way of assigning responsibility does not help rectify structural injustice. From now on, I 
will explain why the liability model does not work for assigning responsibility in structural 
injustice in details. 
First, as I describe, the liability model is a backward-looking model that traces and 
assigns responsibility to particular agents for actions performed in the past. However, the harms 
due to structural injustice cannot be traceable to one agent since this injustice is created by many 
people who typically act within normally accepted rules and principles of the society.37 For 
example, in Sandy’s case discussed in chapter 1, no individual, corporate, and government 
agents did something wrong against Sandy in a liability sense.38 However, Sandy still suffers 
from a lack of options for affordable housing. Although each agent acts within accepted rules, 
collectively agents create such a structural injustice. Therefore, we need a different account than 
the LM to explain how to assign responsibility.  
Second, the liability model has a problem of “blame switching.”39 Young argues that 
people try to avoid blame by using some excuses or political power and blame others based on 
the LM. Since it is hard to trace who should be blamed for structural injustice, the problem of 
blame switching would be rampant in structural injustice. For instance, in a case of the harms 
caused by sweatshops, factory managers who force their workers to work under cruel labor 
conditions insist that they had to do so because an owner of the factory ordered them to do so to 
cut the labor costs. The owner would also claim that he did it because a country where the 
sweatshop’s factory is located allows low labor standards. Its government agents would say that 
it had to allow low labor standards to attract businesses. Finally, CEOs of such businesses would 
																																																						
37 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 100. 
38 Ibid., 99. 
39 Ibid., 117. 
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argue that they have to allow a low labor standard to cut the cost of productions to compete other 
businesses because consumers in developed countries prefer cheaper products. 
Moreover, Young argues that although agents accept blame in the liability model, the 
blamed agents focus on getting rid of the blame from themselves rather than solving the injustice 
itself.40 For example, a CEO of the global apparel company who should be responsible for 
inhumane labor conditions for its factory workers in developing countries just compensates 
workers with some money and claims that the company has done its duty. However, a real 
solution for this injustice is to create a society where there are no such inhumane labor 
conditions. Unless the company focuses on changing its unjust policy inside the company, the 
company still contributes to making this structural injustice. 
Third, Young entertains the possibility of extending the LM to cover issues of structural 
injustice since theories of collective responsibility under the LM are well developed, and it might 
be better to use this familiar model than to introduce a new one.41 She introduces Christopher 
Kutz’s theory of complicity because she regards it as the best effort to extend the LM in relation 
to structural injustice.42 Kutz tries to extend the liability model to explain responsibility for 
solving structural injustice by presenting structured collective harms. He argues that structured 
collective harms come from actions which people are complicit in collective harms and explains 
that “what makes people complicit in any collective action is the fact that each of them intends 
the goal of that collective action as the end of their action.”43 However, Young argues against the 
applicability of his theory to structural injustice. She explains that his theory does not work for 
blaming people for structural injustice because people do not intend to make others vulnerable to 
																																																						
40 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 118. 
41 Ibid., 100-101. 
42 Ibid., 101. 
43 Ibid., 101-102. 
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deprivation or domination when their actions produce structural injustices.44 Nonetheless, Kutz 
still tries to apply the weaker form of the liability model to explain responsibility for structural 
injustice by arguing that people cause unstructured collective harms where each person does not 
intend harm but collectively they still cause harm.45 Young argues that we should not treat 
responsibility for structural injustice as a weaker form of the liability model, but treat this 
responsibility as one of a different kind. We ought to acknowledge that we are responsible for 
structural injustice because “we participate in the ongoing operations of a society in which 
injustice occurs” not because we might be liable for causing harm to others.46  
I agree with Young’s stance that we should not think about responsibility for structural 
injustice in a sense of liability. Structural injustice is not a question about liability in nature. 
Structural injustice happens although none of the participating agents is liable for injustice. 
Moreover, by incorporating the liability model, we lose a focus on what responsibility for 
structural injustice is by having a problem such as blame switching. Therefore, we need a 
different account of responsibility for structural injustice. From the next section, I will explain 
two alternative models for assigning this responsibility, and first explain Young’s social 
connection model.  
The Social Connection Model (SCM) 
Young proposes the social connection model to explain responsibility for structural 
injustice. The SCM shows that “our responsibility derives from belonging together with others in 
a system of interdependent processes of cooperation and competition through which we seek 
benefits and aim to realize projects.”47 Therefore, in this model, although people are not liable 
																																																						
44 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 102.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 104.  
47 Ibid., 105. 
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for some injustices in the legal term, they are still responsible for remedying these injustices 
created by the social structure where they are in. Furthermore, Young argues that “this 
responsibility does not derive from living under a common constitution, but rather from 
participating in the diverse institutional processes that produce structural injustice.”48 Thus, 
people have responsibility for structural injustice not only domestically but also internationally.  
 Young shows that the SCM has four different advantages when it is used to understand 
responsibility for structural injustice. First, the SCM does not isolate one agent who should be 
blamed for the injustice as the liability model does.49 Since we should assign responsibility for 
many people's actions which do not violate accepted norms and rules of the society but still 
collectively create structural injustice, isolation is inadequate to assign this responsibility. For 
example, when consumers in developed countries buy cheap clothes from global apparel 
industries such as H&M, this consumer behavior creates more demands of low-cost labor in 
producers of such clothes in developing countries. These demands ultimately lead to inhumane 
labor conditions to cut the labor costs. In this scenario, the LM cannot assign responsibility for 
consumers because it cannot isolate any unique agent for this injustice. On the contrary, the SCM 
does not isolate one person or group as the responsible party but assigns responsibility for 
structural injustice to all people who are involved in this injustice; thus, this model can assign 
consumers responsibilities to protest to change sweatshop labor conditions.  
 Second, the SCM even questions normally accepted norms and rules. Young argues that 
if people act within the normally accepted norms and rules of the society and contribute to 
creating structural injustice, they should question and change the background conditions of the 
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society which create such injustice.50 In the sweatshop example, buying cheap clothes while not 
trying to improve the inhumane labor conditions of sweatshops is considered acceptable. 
However, if this consumer behavior collectively encourages more inhumane labor conditions in 
sweatshops, this accepted norm should be questioned. We could solve more structural injustices 
such as inhumane labor conditions in sweatshops when we question these accepted norms and 
rules and try to help to improve the labor conditions. Therefore, the SCM can solve structural 
injustice more thoroughly than the LM which only assigns responsibility for clear liable actions 
of harm.  
 Third, the SCM adopts a more forward-looking than backward-looking way to assign 
responsibility. Young argues that structural injustice is an ongoing issue; therefore, it is better to 
assign responsibility on all who contribute to processes producing unjust outcomes than assign 
responsibility only to a liable agent.51 For example, sweatshops are ongoing global structural 
injustices caused in part by consumerism in the capitalized world. By having a forward-looking 
way to assign responsibility in the SCM, people can more proactively solve ongoing and future 
structural injustices such as the harms to factory workers caused by sweatshops.  
 Fourth, the SCM assigns shared personal responsibility to each person who contributes to 
producing unjust outcomes and emphasizes that each person should discharge responsibility for 
rectifying structural injustice with collective actions. Young argues that shared personal 
responsibility requires some actions in each person, and this is different from collective 
responsibility which might not require personal action individually.52 Moreover, Young argues 
that people need to discharge responsibility with collective actions because each person cannot 
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solve structural injustice individually.53 In the sweatshop example, each consumer is required to 
make some certain actions which collectively solve a problem of inhumane labor conditions. 
Therefore, just refraining from buying cheap clothes from sweatshops is not enough. Each 
consumer at least should make a political action to encourage others to refrain from buying 
cheap clothes, for example. This benefit makes responsibility clear for all people who are 
involved in structural injustice by requiring at least some actions from each person and makes 
responsibility more effective by requiring collective actions rather than an ineffective individual 
action.  
As the SCM assigns shared personal responsibility, Young argues that shared 
responsibility in each person can vary depending on four parameters: Power, Privilege, Interest, 
and Collective Ability. First, Young argues that people who have more power changing the 
structure have more responsibility, and people should focus more on a problem where they have 
a greater capacity to influence through structural processes than the other problem.54 Second, 
Young argues that “persons and institutions that are relatively privileged within structural 
processes have greater responsibilities than others to take actions to undermine injustice.”55 She 
also argues that those who are privileged by structural injustice would suffer less from making an 
effort to solve this injustice; thus, they have more responsibility. Third, Young argues that people 
who have an interest in solving injustices such as victims also share the responsibility.56 Fourth, 
Young argues that people who can organize collective actions easily have greater responsibility 
for rectifying structural injustice with collective actions.57  
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Thinking about the responsibility in terms of these four parameters helps each person to 
try to mitigate structural injustice within one’s capacity and interest. However, the SCM does not 
say what each person should do with precision. Zheng criticizes the SCM because it is vague 
when it comes to assigning responsibility, and she proposes an alternative role-ideal model. In 
the next section, I will explain the RIM and why she believes the RIM is better than the SCM.  
The Role-Ideal Model (RIM) 
Zheng proposes the role-ideal model to assign responsibility for solving structural  
injustice. Zheng explains the RIM as follows: “We are, each of us, individually responsible for 
structural injustice through and in virtue of our social roles,” “Individuals are responsible in the 
accountability sense for fulfilling their social roles,” and a role-ideal is not an objective ideal 
social role but a subjective conception of what makes a proper role.58 Therefore, the RIM 
requires each person to fulfill one’s ideal social roles which one has in society. Zheng believes 
that social roles constitute the structure and claims that fulfilling each ideal social role would 
solve structural injustice and create a more just society.  
 Zheng argues that the RIM is better than the SCM in five different ways. First, the RIM is 
clearer on how to rectify structural injustice than the SCM. She argues that the SCM has a 
problem in rectifying structural injustice because power is one of the parameters which decide 
how much agents should be responsible for solving the injustice. Following the SCM, powerful 
agents would maintain structural injustice because such injustice sometimes benefits them.59 On 
the other hand, the RIM just requires people to push the boundaries of their ideal roles to solve 
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structural injustice; thus, they can directly change the structural injustice since roles constitute 
the structure.60  
 Second, the RIM has a better reason why people should rectify structural injustice than 
the SCM. The SCM tries to justify that many people are responsible for structural injustice 
because they are interconnected in the social structure which produces this injustice. However, 
Zheng insists that people might escape from this responsibility easily in the SCM. Indeed, Young 
also admits that people might escape from their responsibility by making a number of excuses, 
claiming Reification, Denying Connection, The Demands of Immediacy, and Not My Job.61 On 
the contrary, within the RIM, roles create the structure; thus, if there is structural injustice, it 
means that some people do not fulfill their ideal roles. Therefore, people must be accountable for 
the injustice by trying to be the best within their ideal roles.62  
 Third, the RIM is clearer on what people are accountable for than the SCM. Within the 
SCM, parameters do not make it clear what people are responsible for. On the other hand, the 
RIM will make clear that people should try to fulfill their ideal roles as what they are 
accountable for.63  
 Fourth, the RIM is clearer on how much people should do to rectify injustice than the 
SCM. Following the SCM, people are responsible for the practically manageable amount of 
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responsibility as a shared responsibility. However, Zheng thinks that it is unclear how much the 
practically manageable amount is. In contrast, people must perform all ideal social roles within 
the RIM. Although Zheng believes that this responsibility might be demanding, she argues that 
this is the truth that people should face to rectify structural injustice.64 
 Fifth, the RIM is clearer on how people can be held accountable for rectifying structural 
injustice than the SCM. Within the SCM, Young does not explain how people can be held 
accountable for the responsibility. However, reminders of fulfilling proper roles from others 
make people accountable under the RIM.65  
Although Zheng tries to argue that the RIM is better than the SCM in those five points 
above, I do not think that her arguments are convincing. In the next section, I will raise some 
objections to Zheng’s arguments and explain why neither the SCM nor the RIM is fully adequate 
for assigning responsibility for solving structural injustice.  
Problems of the SCM and the RIM 
First, Zheng tries to argue that the SCM does not explain well how to rectify structural 
injustice. She claims that thinking about the responsibility in terms of power as one of the 
parameters actually helps powerful agents try to maintain the injustice because such an injustice 
would benefit them. However, Young does not claim that powerful agents can pursue their 
interests when power is one of the parameters to decide how much each person is responsible for 
the injustice. Rather, the SCM tries to encourage people to make a stronger demand on these 
powerful agents to change their behaviors to solve structural injustice because their influence is 
significant. Moreover, if the agent is powerful, this person should acknowledge his influence and 
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try to contribute to rectifying structural injustice. Thus, Zheng misses Young’s point of power as 
one of the parameters.  
Second, Zheng argues that the RIM has a better reason why people should rectify 
structural injustice than the SCM because roles create the structure. However, the RIM has 
actually similar problems as the SCM that people can escape from their responsibility. Since 
each person’s ideal role is subjective according to Zheng, one can set a low expectation of one’s 
ideal role. In that case, each person just avoids responsibility by lowering one’s ideal role as 
people try to avoid responsibility within the SCM. Although Zheng argues that the RIM 
encourages people to think more about what a good role is, it seems to me that we would still 
have a fair number of people who set a low expectation of one’s ideal social roles by trying to 
avoid the responsibility.  
Third, Zheng argues that the RIM is clearer on what people are accountable for than the 
SCM by just fulfilling their ideal social roles. However, following the RIM, each person has 
many simultaneous roles in oneself such as being a parent, being a teacher, being a citizen, being 
a neighbor, etc. When people have so many roles, it might not be clear what to do. Especially 
when the demands of two roles conflict with each other, it is not clear which role a person should 
give more weight to. For example, if a person is a CEO of a company, it is important to have 
high profits for the company to prosper, however, it is also important for citizens to not exploit 
others, for example, to not put one’s employees under the inhuman labor conditions. Although 
we might intuitively agree that we should weigh more the role of citizens and to not exploit the 
laborer, Zheng does not provide guidelines to decide which role people should weigh more on in 
her paper; thus, her model is not adequate to assign responsibility for structural injustice.  
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Fourth, Zheng argues that the RIM is clearer on how much people should do to rectify 
injustice than the SCM. However, the RIM wrongly assigns a quite demanding responsibility by 
requiring people to perform all ideal roles that they have in society. There are some roles which 
are irrelevant for structural injustice, for example, a role as a high school math teacher. 
Moreover, each person fulfilling one’s ideal roles does not change the structure at all. In order to 
change the structure, people who play a role contributing to creating structural injustice should 
act collectively to fulfill their ideal roles. Therefore, Young still raises an important point that 
collective actions are necessary to rectify structural injustice.  
Although Zheng’s objections against the SCM are not totally convincing, there are some 
significant limitations of the SCM. First, Zheng is right that the SCM provides a vague account 
of what people are accountable for. Just having four parameters does not explain a specific 
responsibility that people should bear. Moreover, the SCM provides a vague account of how 
much people should be responsible for solving structural injustice. Although four parameters 
give a sense of how an agent should bear responsibility compared to another by analyzing these 
parameters, it is still not clear how much responsibility each person should bear absolutely.  
Conclusion of Chapter 2 
Overall, both the SCM and the RIM are not fully adequate for assigning responsibility for 
solving structural injustice because they provide a vague account of how much and who must be 
accountable for rectifying structural injustice. Within the SCM, each person at least has some 
shared responsibility, but it is not clear what and how much to do to discharge it. Young argues 
that responsibility is more open than duty for what and how much to do; thus, we do not need a 
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precise account to both questions.66 However, a model should be clear on what and how much to 
do to assign a specific responsibility as Zheng argues in her article.67  
Within the RIM, people have many roles in themselves, and if roles conflict with each 
other, it is not clear what to do. Moreover, the RIM does not explain well how much people 
should do for their responsibility because Zheng includes many irrelevant roles to fulfill and just 
fulfilling each ideal role is not enough for rectifying structural injustice. Therefore, we need a 
different account than the SCM and the RIM to explain what and how much people should be 
accountable for solving structural injustice.  
Before introducing my own model, the Global Citizens Model, to overcome the problems 
that the SCM and the RIM have in chapter 4, I will introduce a problem of sweatshops as an 
empirical case of structural injustice in the next chapter. I will try to persuade readers that 
structural injustice is a morally significant matter and we individually have responsibility for 
contributing to rectifying this type of injustice.   
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Chapter 3: Sweatshops as a Case of Structural Injustice  
So far I described why we should focus on rectifying the unjust structure of society to 
achieve social justice and how existing different theoretical models help us understand and 
assign individual responsibility in relation to structural injustice. In this chapter, I will introduce 
a problem of sweatshops as an empirical case of structural injustice. This should help explain to 
readers why we should care about the harms to factory workers caused by sweatshops, their 
moral significance, and why we have individual responsibility to respond to this type of 
structural injustice.  
 I will first discuss some facts about sweatshops and explain why the harms to factory 
workers caused by sweatshops are morally significant matters. Second, I will explain why it is 
also morally significant for an individual person to discharge one’s responsibility in relation to 
this structural injustice. I will introduce a couple of examples of successful cases where activists 
collectively push powerful collective agents such as governments in developing countries and 
multinational corporations to improve working conditions. Third, I will introduce some 
objections against third parties’ interference with the conditions of sweatshop labor raised by 
Matt Zwolinski. Finally, I will respond to these objections and reiterate that harms to factory 
workers caused by sweatshops are morally significant matters; thus, we have individual 
responsibility for contributing to the elimination of this kind of structural injustice.  
Sweatshops as an Example of Structural Injustice 
Facts about Sweatshops 
There are many structural injustices in the world. In this thesis, I will focus on 
introducing some facts about sweatshops as an empirical case of structural injustice from the 
following reasons. First, focusing on just one case helps to analyze the harms to factory workers 
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caused by sweatshops and their moral significance as one example of structural injustice. 
Moreover, a case of sweatshops is one of the most common structural injustices in the world. 
The apparel industry is a critical component of the global economy. People all over the world are 
working in this vast industry. However, the control of this industry has recently moved into the 
hands of capitalized corporate giants, creating a form of structural injustice that is global.68 After 
WWII, western countries including the United States have rapidly increased the volume of trade 
with poor developing countries, including off-shored apparel production under the assumption of 
comparative advantage in the neo-classical liberal policy.69 Another aspect of apparel production 
is that, because of gender norms, there are many more female workers than male ones and more 
male managers, corresponding to a system of structural subordination of women to men.70 
Finally, rapidly developing industrialization has put pressure on developing countries which are 
the supply chains of the global apparel industry. More industrialization has been accompanied by 
less regulation of working conditions, leading to worker abuse and wages that generate 
impoverishment especially among women in those developing countries.71  
 In this capitalistic world with neoliberal policies, poor factory workers and especially 
women are dominated and deprived of opportunities to grow while rich people who control 
corporate giants and consumers in developed countries get the benefits of the production of 
cheap clothes in sweatshops. Therefore, we need to solve the problem of sweatshops as one of 
the most common structural injustices in the world.  
Moral Significance of Individual Responsibility in relation to Sweatshops  
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In order to persuade readers why each person should care about and discharge his 
individual responsibility for contributing to eliminating the harms suffered by factory workers in 
sweatshops, I will begin by explaining the moral significance of individual responsibility in 
relation to this structural injustice. First of all, the apparel industry is buyer-driven; therefore, 
each person as a consumer of garments has some influence on the apparel industry.72 As a result, 
each person’s action matters regarding harms that factory workers suffer in sweatshops. In the 
following, I will introduce some examples where activists successfully push companies and 
governments to create better working conditions.  
 First, a few students of the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania 
founded B Lab in 2007: a non-profit organization that provides corporations tools for assessment 
and certification to become ethical enterprises.73 Establishing this organization, these activists 
started a movement of benefit corporations which do not only care about their monetary profits 
but also take into account the social benefits they produce.74 These activists argued that we 
should think about what businesses are for. They argued that businesses originally served 
society; thus, they created a movement for the emergence of benefit corporations.75 In this 
movement, activists who have already had power and resources took action to create B Lab.76 
Therefore, it is true that not everyone can make a movement like this happen, but this case still 
shows that people who already have power should discharge their responsibility to make a more 
just society. Although this case does not show that activists contribute to ameliorating working 
conditions of factory workers in developing countries, this case shows that people can 
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collectively have an influence on how businesses are run and the economy works. In fact, 
activists for benefit corporations were relatively successful: companies in 47 countries including 
some in developing countries in Africa and Latin America participated in B lab certification to 
be recognized as benefit corporations.77  
 Second, Gay W. Seidman argues in his book Beyond the Boycott that three transnational 
labor campaigns - the Sullivan framework against apartheid in South Africa, the Rugmark 
campaign against cruel child labor in India, and the Central America campaign against 
sweatshops in Guatemala - have similarities of patterns of consumer mobilization to be 
successful.78 He claims that all three campaigns utilized organized consumer pressure which 
threats market closure where these threats push global brands to accede to monitoring.79 He 
further argues that strong consumer pressure is the result of working with institutions and not of 
individual purchases because companies and politicians respond faster to aggregated demands.80 
This argument shows the importance that each person should discharge his individual 
responsibility but act collectively.  
Furthermore, Seidman argues that activists tend to focus more on universal issues such as 
human rights; thus, local issues are hard to be addressed.81 In a case of sweatshops in Guatemala, 
the Central American campaign activists successfully gave voice to local people to reflect their 
concerns transnationally.82 However, this is not always the case. Seidman argues that it is 
important to push local states to protect their citizens’ labor rights by enabling local workers’ 
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voices heard.83 Then, Seidman shows an example that transnational campaigns led by activists 
pushed the government of the Dominican Republic to enact new labor laws including funding 
and training more effective labor inspectorate.84 
 Following these cases, it is evident that people’s actions have moral significance and the 
potential to rectify cases of structural injustice by pushing powerful actors such as companies 
and governments to work on solving these injustices. However, some people might still argue 
that an individual person does not have the responsibility in relation to such injustices. In the 
next section, I will discuss some strong objections against individuals’ interference with the 
functioning of sweatshops.  
Objections against Interference with the Conditions of Sweatshop Labor 
I have argued that it is important to acknowledge individuals’ responsibility for 
cooperating to eliminate or reduce the harms that factory workers suffer in sweatshops, as shown 
in the empirical cases explained in the last section. However, critics like Zwolinski have raised 
several objections against interference with the conditions of sweatshop labor. He gives the 
following two main reasons.  
 First, he argues that workers exercise their autonomy to choose to work under sweatshop 
conditions, even though he acknowledges that workers’ choices are severely limited.85 
According to Zwolinski, workers’ choices are autonomous choices because they are choices that 
have central importance of their identities; they choose to work to survive and help their family 
survive. In that case, activists’ pressure to create legal regulations or any other activities leading 
to close the sweatshops are wrong because such practices lead to deprivation of workers’ 
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exercise of autonomous choice by reducing options.86 Zwolinski argues that when people’s 
autonomous choices are central importance to their lives, we should respect their autonomous 
choices. This explains why we should also respect workers’ autonomy of working under the 
sweatshop conditions and should not interfere with changing the functioning of sweatshops.87 
 Second, Zwolinski insists that providing work under sweatshop conditions is still better 
than not providing any opportunities to work in sweatshops at all.88 He argues that sweatshops do 
not make workers worse off.89 Although workers in the sweatshops might suffer from brutal 
working conditions such as worker abuse, they are still better off than they would be without 
jobs. This is because they get financial benefits which they need to sustain their and their 
family’s lives. Therefore, Zwolinski argues that since we do not blame rich people in developed 
countries who do nothing to help factory workers, we cannot also blame people who run global 
apparel companies and provide the option of working in sweatshops because the sweatshops are 
better than nothing.90  
Refuting the Objections 
Zwolinski’s objections miss a crucial point of structural injustice. The theory of structural 
injustice focuses on how people contribute to creating injustices in society, even when they just 
act within the accepted laws and moral norms. Zwolinski’s focus on the problem of sweatshops 
is so narrow that he does not question the status quo and has a limited view of moral obligations.  
 First, he argues that workers’ choices of working in sweatshops are exercises of their 
autonomy because their choices are central importance to their survival. Therefore, we should 
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respect their autonomy and not intervene. However, although there are many accounts of 
autonomy in the philosophical literature, typically accounts of autonomy require more exercise 
of agency than Zwolinski’s account. His argument that workers exercise autonomy of choosing 
to work under the sweatshop conditions is unconvincing because they are given a very 
constrained set of options such as starvation, sweatshops, or prostitution. Zwolinski is right that 
working under the sweatshop conditions is a rational choice among those three choices. 
However, rational choice is not enough to satisfy the conditions of autonomous choice. In order 
to argue that workers exercise their autonomy to choose their working conditions, they should 
have more and better options for work because autonomy is assured with a certain number of 
meaningful choices. Therefore, when workers are only provided limited choices, the autonomy 
of workers is undermined; thus, if we are concerned with workers’ autonomy, we need to change 
this environment of limited working options.  
 Zwolinski argues, however, that trying to change this environment by pushing for 
regulation of sweatshop labor conditions may deprive workers of their best options for work. 
Thus, we should not interfere. On the contrary, he advocates for letting the market and individual 
companies deal with this injustice, and this is the best thing that we can do. However, this way of 
thinking shows that Zwolinski only analyzes people’s moral obligations with a limited 
framework, that is within the normally accepted rules and moral norms.  
We individually have responsibility for rectifying this structural injustice as seen in the 
case of sweatshops. Therefore, we should try to improve labor conditions of the factory workers 
by pushing relevant agents such as the government. Although we might fail to provide better 
working conditions if the regulation leads to the reduction of working options, we should try to 
find another strategy to improve the conditions. We can also try to push the government harder 
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by asking it to not only create strict regulations for the labor conditions but also subsidize some 
companies to provide better working conditions for the factory workers. Zwolinski 
acknowledges that voluntary efforts for improving working conditions by private enterprises are 
acceptable as long as these efforts do not lead to removing workers’ options.91 In that case, if we 
can also push the government to help companies to ensure better working conditions for workers, 
it seems right that we can and should also push the government as well.  
 Second, he argues that working in sweatshops is better than having no working 
opportunities at all for poor people in developing countries who need jobs to sustain their and 
their family’s lives. However, an argument of “better than nothing” does not justify non-
interference from a moral point of view. First of all, Zwolinski acknowledges that workers need 
to work under cruel conditions to get little financial benefits.92 In that case, no matter how high 
or small workers’ financial compensation is, it is still wrong when workers are harmed and their 
human rights are violated, for example, when workers are forcibly locked in a factory and not 
allowed to leave. Although Zwolinski insists that it is an extremely strong moral claim that 
multi-national enterprises ought to provide certain minimum working conditions, it seems to me 
that these enterprises should be responsible for satisfying minimum working conditions once 
they decide to hire workers.    
Moreover, he argues that sweatshops at least do not make workers worse off since 
working in sweatshops lets them temporarily survive, given the oppressive conditions of their 
lives. However, these practices actually make workers worse off in the long-run by limiting their 
possibilities of developing their capacities and keeping them in poverty as workers are paid very 
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low wages. Furthermore, these practices actually also make workers worse off even in the short-
run by causing harms to them with violating their human rights.  
Finally, Zwolinski understands responsibility as liability for the harms that workers suffer 
in sweatshops. He argues that factory managers should improve working conditions in 
sweatshops by refraining from worker abuse since they are liable for causing harms to the 
workers.93 In this case, the liable way of assigning responsibility seems to work well for 
improving the working conditions. However, this way of thinking also has limitations of 
assigning responsibility. Zwolinski argues that we cannot blame rich people who do nothing to 
contribute to solving this structural injustice because they are not liable for harms to factory 
workers. In that case, we cannot also blame those who provide harsh labor conditions in the 
sweatshops but give workers opportunities to work.  
However, each person individually has responsibility for collectively rectifying structural 
injustice not because one might be liable for different instances of injustice in some way but 
simply because each person participated in the structural processes that create such structural 
injustice. In that case, rich people who do nothing might not be liable for contributing to cause 
harms to factory workers in sweatshops, but they still need to discharge their individual 
responsibility to contribute to improving working conditions of the factory workers.  
Conclusion of Chapter 3 
Zwolinski might argue that my responses to this objection entail an extremely strong 
moral claim.94 However, the claim that my understanding of responsibility is too demanding is 
not enough to deny we have moral responsibility. The harms that factory workers suffer in 
sweatshops are morally significant matters and are cases of structural injustice. Moreover, people 
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can make changes for the better by discharging their own responsibility as it is shown in the 
successful cases I presented earlier, so we should carry such a responsibility. As long as we are 
acting within the currently, normally accepted laws and moral norms, structural injustice will 
remain. Thus, by questioning those accepted rules and norms and discharging individual 
responsibility collectively, we can finally start eliminating different types of structural injustice.  
In this chapter, we understand that structural injustice is a significant moral matter and an 
individual person should be responsible for contributing to rectifying this injustice. Therefore, in 
the next chapter, I will introduce my own model, The Global Citizens Model (GCM), to explain 
how we should assign individual responsibility in relation to structural injustice. 
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Chapter 4: The Global Citizens Model (GCM) 
In this chapter, I will argue for the view that people have individual responsibility for 
rectifying structural injustice based on their roles as global citizens. I will present my model, the 
Global Citizens Model (GCM), and explain how this model can overcome the problem that the 
SCM and the RIM have because the responsibility they assign to individuals is quite vague. I 
will argue that the GCM gives an adequate response to the problem of assigning responsibility 
for solving structural injustice. 
Before presenting the GCM, I want to acknowledge that both the SCM and the RIM have 
certain strengths as models that help us think about individual responsibility for structural 
injustice, even though they also have some limitations to assign such responsibility. First, the 
SCM explains well that those who are not liable for some particular type of structural injustice 
still can be considered responsible for solving this injustice. This is because people live in an 
interconnected world and our actions, combined with the actions of other people, have structural 
effects. The RIM, on the other hand, has the insight that one way of assigning responsibility is by 
considering ideal roles. This insight is effective as a theoretical model because people can be 
held accountable for their actions or omissions and reminded by others about their 
responsibilities associated with their roles. Thus, I will construct the GCM by relying on some 
strengths of the SCM and the RIM as the models, avoiding weaknesses of these models.  
In what follows, I will introduce the GCM. I will first explain what responsibilities we 
have as citizens of a particular country, by considering Will Kymlicka’s argument about 
citizenship. Second, I will explain why the responsibilities of citizens are not limited to the 
domestic sphere but extend to the international sphere, by analyzing Jeremy Waldron’s argument 
about world citizenship. Third, I will introduce a definition of global citizens, building upon the 
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Waldron’s argument about how to understand the idea of “world citizens”. I will also show how 
this definition is in line with Young’s claims about the responsibilities of global citizens in her 
SCM. Fourth, I will clarify what the role of global citizens is in my view. Fifth, I will explain 
why the GCM is better than existing models such as the SCM and the RIM. Finally, I will 
anticipate some objections against the GCM and respond to them. 
The Global Citizens Model 
Definition of Global Citizens:  
Those who are political agents, living within a system of interdependent processes of 
cooperation and competition and participating in the diverse institutional processes that produce 
structural effects. 
Tasks Associated to the Role of Global Citizens: 
(1) Be informed of issues around the world and assess how to respond to those issues by using 
four parameters (power, privilege, interest, and collective ability), and (2) Based on these 
parameters, join or support collective efforts to (a) rectify structural injustice, (b) make people 
refrain from actions which collectively cause structural injustice, or (c) pressure powerful actors 
in relevant areas to solve injustice.  
Responsibilities of Domestic Citizens  
I will first discuss what responsibilities we have as domestic citizens before considering 
our responsibilities of global citizens, about which there are more controversies. Once we can 
reach an agreement about the responsibilities of domestic citizens, I will try to make the case that 
these responsibilities are not confined to the domestic sphere but also extended internationally.  
Kymlicka argues that the health and stability of modern democratic states depends not 
only on the justice of the basic structure of society but also on the qualities and attitudes of their 
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citizens.95 He claims that institutional mechanisms, policies, and laws are not enough to check 
self-interest and to maintain a liberal democracy. For example, if many citizens are irresponsible 
for their health conditions, the government cannot provide adequate health care for those 
citizens.96 Moreover, if many citizens do not actively vote in elections, the functioning of 
democratic institutions is undermined. Thus, he argues that responsible personal decisions and 
behavior are critical to sustainable public policy in democratic states and that there are certain 
responsibilities required by liberal democratic citizenship.97 His discussion focuses on the 
following four virtues that citizens should have to maintain liberal democratic institutions: 
Public-Spiritedness, a Sense of Justice, Civility and Tolerance, and a Shared Sense of Solidarity 
or Loyalty.98 
First, Kymlicka claims that public-spiritedness is a virtue that liberal citizens must have 
when they make and justify their political demands. These demands must be understood and 
accepted by fellow citizens. This requires that demands are made in terms that others can 
understand and be consistent with their status as free and equal. Furthermore, this virtue includes 
the ability and willingness to engage in public discourse.99 Second, the virtue of a sense of justice 
is important for those who are politically active citizens. Kymlicka insists when political 
institutions do not work to rectify injustices in society, only citizens’ political actions can solve 
them. For this reason, citizens have responsibility to take political actions against these 
injustices.100 Third, civility and tolerance are minimal responsibilities of citizens for society to be 
well-ordered. These virtues require non-discrimination not only in the government’s laws and 
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policies but also in individual actions of citizens. Citizens exercising this virtue treat others as 
equals.101 Fourth, a shared sense of solidarity or loyalty is a virtue that citizens must have to 
create social unity by identifying with fellow citizens as members of the same society.102 For 
Kymlicka, this means that citizens must have a sense of belonging together to the same political 
community. 
I agree with Kymlicka that classical liberals fail to explain the contribution that citizens’ 
virtues and activities make to the stability of liberal democracy.103 Citizens sustain the structure 
of their countries and gain benefits from social cooperation within the structure, so they must be 
responsible for acting in ways that display public-spiritedness, a sense of justice, and civility that 
support healthy liberal democratic institutions. However, Kymlicka also argues that shared 
solidarity and identity is an important virtue for citizens to maintain social unity, but he admits 
that this is hard to achieve within multi-national states. 104   
In the next section, building upon Waldron’s argument about world citizenship, I will 
argue that solidarity does not actually require a shared sense of national belonging. Hence, the 
responsibilities of citizens are not only limited to the domestic level but also extend to the 
international level in the next section.  
Responsibilities of Citizens Across Borders 
In order to argue that the responsibilities of citizens are not only domestic but also global, 
I will analyze Waldron’s defense of the idea of world citizenship and how he responds to a 
common objection against this idea. One common objection is that there are no world citizens 
because there is no world government. Waldron first argues that citizens and subjects are not the 
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same things. When we think about subjects, we think about people who live under the power of 
some overarching organization. However, citizens do not need such an overarching organization 
to act as citizens. Citizens live under a political regime which has structures for making some 
collective decisions, but they do not need such structures to act as citizens.105 Therefore, it makes 
sense to talk about world citizenship in the absence of world government. Furthermore, Waldron 
claims that the absence of such an overarching organization in the international level makes the 
responsibilities of citizens more important.106 
 Second, Waldron claims that the responsibilities of citizens include more than formal 
participation in political decision making. He argues that willingness to play a role and work 
with others even informally is a key aspect of their responsibilities of domestic and global 
citizens. As global citizens work hard to create a dense network of informal global interactions 
and cooperation such as global NGOs or the global cooperation of academics and scientists, their 
activities can sustain a flourishing globalized civil society.107 Therefore, there are responsibilities 
of global citizens even without the world government. 
 Third, Waldron argues that some of the responsibilities of global citizens are already 
subsumed under the responsibilities of citizens of particular countries. He argues that citizens of 
particular countries sometimes should prioritize international benefits over national benefits, for 
example, in maintaining practices of international diplomacy and other international structures 
because this prioritization promotes justice in the world.108 This responsibility is similar to the 
responsibility of domestic citizens. Sometimes people should prioritize their country’s benefits 
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over the benefits of a region of that country, for example, in refraining from exercising regional 
voting rights in a way that undermines a country because this prioritization promotes justice in 
the country.109 Therefore, if we accept the claim that people have responsibilities of domestic 
citizens, it is plausible to assume that people have responsibilities of global citizens.  
 I agree with Waldron that critics of the idea of global citizenship fail to show that there 
are no global citizens simply because there is no world government. Although there is no world 
government, we customarily carry responsibilities of global citizens, for example, in certain 
aspects of practices of international diplomacy. Furthermore, as Waldron argues, informal 
actions by people in the world create global interactions and cooperation that sustain a globalized 
civil society. Therefore, in the absence of the world government, we still have responsibilities of 
global citizens.  
The Definition of Global Citizens in the GCM 
 As I articulate the responsibilities of citizens and how these responsibilities also extend to 
the international level, I want to defend the view that we should understand global citizens in 
certain ways. First, I define global citizens as political agents because citizens have similar 
political responsibilities to the ones Kymlicka describes, particularly when he discusses the 
virtue of a sense of justice. I also describe global citizens in similar terms as Young, who thinks 
that people are responsible for structural injustice even if they are not liable for the injustice.  
Young argues that people have responsibility for solving structural injustice because they 
are participants in interdependent processes of cooperation and competition. Moreover, people 
are not only responsible for the injustices that exist domestically but also internationally. Their 
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responsibility derives from participating in the diverse institutional processes that produce 
structural injustice, which does not stop at borders.110  
Being aware of the fact that we participate in interdependent processes of cooperation 
and competition is the key to cultivating public-spiritedness, an important virtue of citizens. 
Thus, I define global citizens as those who are participants in interdependent processes of 
cooperation and competition. Moreover, participating in the diverse institutional processes 
sometimes brings structural injustice but brings benefits at other times. This type of international 
political participation also does not assume the world government and highlight informal global 
interactions by global citizens. Therefore, I also define global citizens as those who participate in 
the diverse institutional processes that produce structural effects. As a result, the definition of 
global citizens is the following: Those who are political agents, living within a system of 
interdependent processes of cooperation and competition and participating in the diverse 
institutional processes that produce structural effects. 
The Role as the Global Citizens  
In this section, I will clarify the specific role that global citizens have in the GCM. 
The GCM appeals to the idea of fulfilling a particular role for solving structural injustice, in a 
way that is similar to the RIM. Since a model for assigning responsibility should have some 
mechanism to hold people accountable, setting a role to fulfill is important to understand and to 
assign certain responsibilities to try to rectify structural injustice.  
However, this model is different from the RIM in terms of focusing on the specific role 
of the global citizens, which requires fulfilling certain political responsibilities for solving 
structural injustice. As I have pointed out in chapter 2, one problem of the RIM is that this model 
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does not explain what is our responsibility to do because different roles might conflict with each 
other. Neither does it explain how much to do, because the RIM might require people to fulfill 
roles that are not relevant to problems of structural injustice such as being a high school math 
teacher. Furthermore, Zheng might not consider global citizens as people’s social role to fulfill in 
the RIM because he focuses on conventionally accepted social roles in the domestic sphere. 
On the other hand, the GCM makes explicit that citizens have political responsibilities to 
fulfill guided by one key virtue of citizens described by Kymlicka, a sense of justice. In my view, 
focusing on the role of global citizens who discharge their political responsibilities to solve 
structural injustice, the GCM can better address global problems than the RIM. 
Moreover, the GCM is different from the RIM because the GCM proposes an ideal role 
of global citizens that is objective, in contrast to ideal social roles subjectively determined that 
the RIM relies on. Subjectivity in deciding what certain ideal roles require is problematic 
because people might be able to escape their responsibilities by setting low expectations for their 
ideal social roles. In contrast, the GCM sets an objective ideal role of the global citizens, that can 
avoid this problem. Since global citizens bear responsibility for structural injustice by 
participating in the diverse institutional processes that produce structural injustice, it is important 
to clarify and defend the tasks that are associated with this role of global citizens.  
Some key tasks are (1) Be informed of issues around the world and assess how to respond 
to those issues by using four parameters (Power, Privilege, Interest, and Collective Ability), and 
(2) Based on these parameters, join or support collective efforts to (a) rectify structural injustice, 
(b) make people refrain from actions which collectively cause structural injustice, or (c) pressure 
powerful actors in relevant areas to solve injustice.  
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The first task is important. It should be guided by the exercise of public-spiritedness, one 
of the key virtues of citizens because people must understand the general public needs in order to 
be well-informed about the world issues. I also use the idea that there are four parameters to 
think about our responsibilities that Young proposes. These are useful to help people assess how 
much they can and should contribute to solving structural injustice, as they help to think about 
political responsibilities in relation to structural injustice in a comprehensive way. First, power is 
a parameter because if people have more power than others to change the structure, then they 
have more responsibilities for doing so. Moreover, this parameter helps people to focus more on 
a problem where they have a higher capacity to be effective than on other problems. Second, 
privilege is a parameter that helps people to realize that if they occupy a more privileged position 
owing to structural injustice, they have more responsibilities for contributing to solving this type 
of injustice. Moreover, privileged people should have more responsibility for rectifying 
structural injustice because they are less susceptible to suffering from adverse consequences for 
making an effort to solve this injustice. Third, interest is a parameter that guides people to have 
more responsibility for contributing to solving structural injustice if they have a compelling 
interest in solving this injustice. Finally, collective ability is a parameter that helps people to 
discharge their responsibility if they can easily organize collective actions or join an already 
existing movement.  
It is important to be informed about the issues in the world and to think about how to 
respond to those issues by using all the four parameters. By assessing your power and collective 
ability, you can better understand how much you are actually able to contribute to solving some 
structural injustices. By assessing your privilege, you can better understand how much you 
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should contribute to rectifying such injustices. Finally, by assessing your interest in such 
injustices, you can decide which injustices you want to contribute more to solve.  
The second task is also important, and it involves the exercise of a sense of justice, 
another key virtue of citizens. The three options mentioned in the second task point to different 
ways to discharge one’s political responsibility based on the assessment one makes using 
Young’s parameters. For example, if an agent has power and collective ability to solve structural 
injustice, this agent should choose the option (a) of rectifying a particular kind of structural 
injustice by himself. However, this possibility is limited to very powerful agents, for example, 
those who are the wealthiest people in the world, or those who can organize collective efforts, 
such as the head of academic, nonprofit, and religious institutions. Second, if an agent has a very 
privileged situation or has an interest in certain injustices but does not have much ability to 
contribute on his own, he can either choose the option (b) of making people refrain from actions 
which collectively cause structural injustice or the option (c) of pressuring powerful actors in 
relevant areas to solve injustice. 
Therefore, the tasks associated with the role of global citizens, which I introduced earlier 
in this section, describe the responsibilities of people all over the world as global citizens. Based 
on my definition of these tasks, responsible agents are not only people with some amount of 
power and privilege but also those who are victims of structural injustices but have a compelling 
interest in solving them. With these tasks, people in the world are required to be more conscious 
about structural injustice and help solve this injustice together by exercising public-spiritedness 
and a sense of justice.  
Advantages of the Global Citizens Model over Other Existing Models   
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Although the SCM describes well why more people need to acknowledge their 
responsibility for structural injustice, this model has some flaws because it does not clarify what 
and how much people should be responsible for. The RIM tries to offer an alternative to the 
SCM by describing ideal roles to fulfill, but this model also does not answer the question of what 
and how much people should be responsible for. The GCM still shares a number of insights with 
the other two models, but it articulates a specific role of the global citizens, which can be used to 
make clearer what and how much people should be responsible for. In this way, they can be held 
accountable for not discharging their responsibility. Therefore, I believe that the GCM is the best 
solution to assign individual responsibility for solving structural injustice.  
Although I believe that the GCM is more convincing than the LM, the SCM, and the 
RIM, it is important to consider some possible objections to this model and respond to them. I 
will respond to five possible objections against the GCM in the next section. 
Some Objections to the GCM  
The Subjectivity of the Assessment of the Four Parameters 
First, people might criticize this model by arguing that the first task of the GCM does not 
help people to work to rectify structural injustice. They might argue that an assessment of how to 
respond to the issues in the world by using the four parameters is still subjective; thus, people 
might try to escape from their responsibility by making some excuses as Young suggested they 
can do in response to her SCM. Therefore, the GCM does not improve Zheng’s RIM because the 
GCM also suffers the problem of subjectivity as much as the RIM does.  
 Although I agree with this objection that the assessment of our specific responsibilities to 
make decisions about what to do is subjective, I do not think that the task (1) would let people 
escape from their responsibility. Requiring people to be informed about issues around the world 
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and to assess how to respond to those issues by using four parameters, the GCM implies that 
many citizens of rich countries should realize how privileged they are and how much influence 
they can have to solve structural injustice. Therefore, although the personal assessment of 
responsibility is still a subjective process, it is reasonable to expect that people would try to 
acknowledge more responsibilities after completing the task (1) than to escape from their 
responsibility.  
Too Demanding 
Second, people might argue that the two tasks described as associated with the role of 
global citizens are too demanding to fulfill. This is true but, as Zheng also insists in her paper, 
the fact that the responsibilities of a role are too demanding does not justify people to ignore 
them.111 Having demanding moral responsibilities is the reality that people in developed 
countries should face. Moreover, focusing on just the role of fulfilling one’s political 
responsibility as a global citizen, this model turns out to be less demanding than the RIM which 
requires people to fulfill all of their ideal social roles. As we live in the interconnected world, 
and our normally accepted actions can have negative effects on other people even when this is 
not our intention, discharging some of our responsibilities of citizens is the minimum we should 
do to make more just societies and a more just world. 
People Have Responsibility other than Their Responsibility as Global Citizens 
Following the previous objection, some people might still argue that they do not only 
have responsibility as global citizens but also have responsibility as workers, as family members, 
etc. Therefore, it is excessively demanding for them to fulfill the tasks required to be good global 
citizens.  
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I agree that people have many responsibilities within their multiple social roles in society. 
However, having many responsibilities within their multiple social roles does not justify that 
they do not have to do what they can to respond to injustice as global citizens. Moreover, by 
constructing the GCM, I try to highlight political responsibility that global citizens have as they 
are contributing by their activities to structural injustice, but they are also able to collaborate to 
rectify such injustice. 
People can see what their role as family members makes them responsible for since there 
are more clear expectations about how to fulfill this social role. However, people might not be 
able to grasp what their role as global citizens requires because this role is complex. The GCM 
proposes some ways to understand this role more clearly and why it requires them to contribute 
to solving structural injustice.   
Responsibility as Domestic Citizens versus Responsibility as Global Citizens  
 Fourth, some people might argue that they have responsibility as domestic citizens but 
not as global citizens. First of all, I have already rejected this view that people only have 
responsibility as domestic citizens when I analyzed Kymlicka’s and Waldron’s arguments 
previously in this chapter. People should be responsible citizens exercising virtues such as 
public-spiritedness and a sense of justice because this is necessary for their society to prosper. 
Furthermore, being responsible citizens is required not only in the domestic sphere but also in the 
international sphere since citizenship does not merely mean living under the same political 
regime but also means acting as responsible citizens. Such responsible citizens should think 
about their influence not only domestically but also internationally.  
 Nonetheless, some people might still insist that people should prioritize responsibility as 
domestic citizens over responsibility as global citizens. For example, when there are American 
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factory workers who are harmed by sweatshop labor conditions in the United States, other 
American citizens have stronger moral obligation to discharge their political responsibilities to 
improve their fellows’ working conditions than to do so for Indonesian factory workers who are 
harmed by sweatshop labor conditions in Indonesia.  
In fact, I acknowledge that it is sometimes permissible for American citizens to rescue 
fellow Americans when they can more effectively rectify this local injustice than global injustice 
by utilizing Young’s four parameters. However, as we have seen some effective collective 
actions against global injustices in chapter 3, some Americans might also be able to rescue 
Indonesian workers as effectively as American workers. In that case, as I show that citizenship 
does not merely mean living under the same political regime and having the same formal 
political status, Americans should not always prefer recusing American workers to Indonesian 
workers just because they are both Americans. In the interconnected world where American 
consumers might participate in structural processes that create harms to Indonesian factory 
workers but have a capacity to improve their working conditions effectively, the American 
consumers as global citizens should treat American workers and Indonesian workers equally. 
The Difficulty of a Shared Sense of Solidarity in Global Citizenship  
Fifth, Kymlicka argues that a shared sense of solidarity is also an important requirement 
for citizenship. He then further argues that people need to share some common history or 
language to create social unity.112 This requirement is hard to be satisfied in the case of global 
citizenship as Kymlicka explains that a sense of shared transnational identity is hard to be 
established in multi-national states, and it would be even harder at a global level.113  
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  I agree with Kymlicka that global citizens might have difficulty to feel some sense of 
shared identity with others due to the lack of common history and language. However, the shared 
sense of identity might be a sufficient condition for global citizenship, but it is not a necessary 
condition. If people in the world have a more shared sense of identity, it is, of course, easier to 
create a sense of global citizenship and establish better terms for international cooperation. 
However, even if they do not have such a shared sense of identity, it does not mean that they do 
not have to act as responsible global citizens. As people live in the interconnected world, their 
daily behaviors economically and politically have an impact on others around the world. 
Moreover, informal collective actions by people in the world also sustain this globalized society. 
Therefore, there is shared global citizenship even though we do not have a shared sense of 
identity among global citizens.  
 Furthermore, as Kymlicka argues, civility and tolerance, non-discrimination in individual 
actions that affect fellow citizens, are required to act as good citizens. Therefore, even if people 
in the world do not share the same identity due to the lack of the common language and history, 
these virtues can help global citizens to understand and embrace different people, ultimately 
leading to an increased sense of shared solidarity among global citizens.  
Conclusion of Chapter 4 
In conclusion, the GCM is a more promising model to assign people responsibility to 
rectify structural injustice than the LM, the SCM, and the RIM. This model is clearer about how 
much and what people should be responsible to do, by requiring them to fulfill an objective ideal 
role of global citizens. As I presented an empirical case of sweatshops in chapter 3, structural 
injustice is a morally significant problem and more people in developed countries should feel 
responsible for it and try to solve it. The GCM is the best solution for assigning individual 
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responsibility in relation to structural injustice because it clarifies people’s political 
responsibilities for rectifying this injustice, giving them clear tasks to do to discharge their 
responsibilities.  
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Conclusion 
 As we have seen the case of sweatshops as an empirical case of structural injustice in 
chapter 3, there are normative problems that sweatshops raise. This type of injustice is rapidly 
increasing as the world becomes more and more globalized economically, politically, and 
socially. Thus, my concern is that many people as consumers in developed countries are not 
aware of their responsibilities for improving the working conditions of factory workers when 
they participate in processes that create this structural injustice. Therefore, I try to show why 
people in the world, especially many people in developed countries, should carry more 
responsibilities and cooperate to reduce structural injustice. In this thesis, I argue that we can 
assign them individual responsibility for structural injustice, using the role of global citizens. 
 I understand that an ethical argument aiming to change people’s behaviors is sometimes 
ineffective to create social change, especially with complicated problems involving structural 
injustice. Although people might understand the theory of why structural injustice is a significant 
moral issue and why they have individual responsibility for it, this ethical argument might not 
lead to changing their behaviors. Changing people’s behaviors might begin when they internalize 
the moral norm that they should act as responsible citizens to collectively mitigate such global 
injustice.  
However, internalizing such a moral norm also starts from deep ethical reflection on 
individual responsibility for structural injustice. First, people start critical moral investigations on 
injustice, but they also need to cultivate key virtues of global citizens such as public-spiritedness 
and a sense of justice. Once people make critical ethical judgments and share the view that they 
have moral obligations at the global level, they can finally internalize this moral norm and follow 
it to create a more just society.  
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Moreover, as people investigate what they should do, they also consider what they can 
actually do. We have seen in chapter 3 that it is possible for individuals to act and rectify certain 
injustices, as activists founding B Lab and the Central American campaign activists in 
Guatemala did. People should realize that there are many things they can do as global citizens. In 
conclusion, internalizing the moral norm that people should collectively rectify structural 
injustice starts from ethical reflection on different forms of structural injustice, and this reflection 
helps people realize that they can do more to mitigate injustice as responsible global citizens. 
Therefore, ethical reflection is the first crucial step for solving many important global problems.  
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